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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an improved CRTHACS
scheme for secure group communications. The scheme
resists several GCD attacks which exist in the original
CRTHACS scheme [2] and were recently reported in [1].
1. Introduction
Secure group communication (SGC) with hierarchical
access control (HAC) refers to a scenario where a group
of members is divided into different privileged subgroups
located at different levels and a high-level subgroup can re-
ceive and decrypt messages within any of its descendant
lower-level subgroups, but the converse is not allowed.
In [2], a Chinese Remainder Theorem based HAC
scheme (CRTHACS) for SGC was proposed. The scheme
was intended not only to enforce HAC but also to operate
without disclosing the hierarchy and the receivers. How-
ever, some recent attacks, presented in [1], and based on
computing certain greatest common divisors (GCDs), have
been shown to disclose the hidden hierarchy. In this paper,
we propose a solution to defeat these GCD attacks, thus
keeping the hierarchy hidden.
In sections 2 and 3, we briefly summarize the CRTHACS
scheme from [2] and three kinds of GCD based attacks from
[1], respectively. We describe our solution for countering
the attacks in section 4.
Throughout this paper,  
 
  denotes public key en-
cryption under key  and  
 
secret key encryption under
key .
2. CRTHACS for SGC
In CRTHACS there is a Group Controller (GC) and sub-
groups 

, as well as a subgroup controller for each 

,
which will also be denoted by 

. The GC has a pair of
public and private keys  

 

, and so does each sub-
group

, denoted by (

 

). The GC maintains the entire
hierarchical structure of the group; generates a random set
of pairwise relatively prime numbers 
 
 

 

     

,
where 
 
is public, while the remaining 

are secret.
There are also positive integers 

, one for each subgroup


, defined by equation (2). The GC computes 

and
	
 

and sends 

, 	
 

and 

to 

by means of a secure channel. Let  

 
 


     

 
 be
the collection of all ancestral subgroups of

, and consider
below the system of congruences (1) and equation (2) which
define 	
 

and

respectively.
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(1)


 

 



  

 
(2)
To every subgroup 

a six-tuple
(

 



 

 	
 



) is assigned, where


is the secret data communication key for 

. 

is sent
securely to the GC by 

and except for 

, the remaining
five elements are kept secret, known only by 

. Besides
knowing its subgroup’s six elements, every participant 
has its own public and private key (

,

).
Whenever a participant  with identity 

in 

sends
a message
 , it broadcasts the tuple (

, 

,  



)
where 

is computed as:


= 	
 

 



=  


 



  



  
 
(3)
When a receiver  receives (

, 

,  



), it
can check whether the message is intended for itself, verify
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both the sender and the message, and decrypt the message
if the check and verification succeed or discard the message
otherwise.
3. GCD based attacks
In [1], the authors put forth three possible attacks, all
based on computing a number of GCD’s, which make pos-
sible the disclosure of the hierarchy.
1. Note that  
 
is dependent on messages, but
   
 
is not. In particular, from the first equation
of (3) any two instances of  
 
will differ by a multiple
of  
 
. Therefore from the  
 
’s of more than two mes-
sages of the same subgroup
 
, an attacker (outside
 
) can
derive information about 
 
, as  
 
 
 
 

   mod
 
 
. Hence,  
 
 
  
 

	  
 
 
  
 

 di-
vides  
 
. If the attacker has several  
 
 
at his disposal
he refines this information about 
 
.
2. The subgroup
 
may figure out its ancestor

(i.e.,


)
by computing  
 
	    
 


 

 
 since
 
possesses 
 
and   
 
and can compute

 

 
.
3. If two subgroup 
 
and 

collude, they may find their
common ancestor

(i.e.,


) by computing  
 





 
	  






.
4. Improved CRTHACS
The solution to the three attacks can be summarized as
three modifications to the original CRTHACS scheme:
1. Move the signed MAC out of  
 
and send the signed
MAC as a separate item. Thus,  
 
will be independent
of messages. This will beat the attack of the first kind.
2. Remove    
 
and replace  
 
with a new
 
 
. Moreover the new  
 
will now be computed by
the GC. Instead of sending    
 
and 
 
to 
 
, the
GC just sends  
 
to
 
. 
 
uses  
 
directly but does
not know 
 
. Thus, the second attack is defeated.
3. Replace the public encryption of 




 
, correspond-
ing to its ancestral subgroup 
 

, with a secret key encryp-
tion 
 




in the congruence system (1). As a result,
 
cannot compute 
 



related to its ancestral subgroup


because 
 
does not know 

. This defeats the third
type of attack. In fact, this modification also defeats the sec-
ond attack since 

 

 
 is not involved in    
 
.
We describe the modifications in detail. The
   
 
and  
 
are removed from the scheme and
 
 
is computed by the GC and sent to 
 
directly. The
system of equations (1) is replaced by the system (4) as fol-
lows:
 
 
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
 
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(4)
The 

 
	 


	    	 


are as in the original CRTHACS.
Every subgroup controller 
 
will no longer have six but
five elements: (
 
	 
 
	
 
	 

 
	  
 
) and every participant
  
 
will also have five elements (

	 

	
 
	 

 
	  
 
).
Initially, the GC sends 

 
and  
 
to the subgroup con-
troller
 
securely, and then
 
multicasts the two values to
all participants in its subgroup.
Whenever participant   
 
, with identity 

,
sends a message  , it computes and sends (

,
 
 
,   , 


), where    



 





. As indicated above, the
   is sent as a separate item.
Assume that sender   
 
. When a receiver  re-
ceives (

,  
 
,   , 


), it proceeds
as follows: (1) If   
 
, then  has the same key 
 
as
sender . If   

where 

is an ancestral subgroup
of 
 
,  computes    
 
 


(i.e, 
 


 
)
and decrypts  to get 
 
, (2)  computes   
 



and    
 
 

 
, (3)  compares  and ; if
  , the verification of the key fails (there are two pos-
sibilities: the  
 
was modified during transmission or
the receiver is not in the sender’s subgroup or its ancestral
subgroups). The receiver discards the message. Otherwise
(i.e.,   ), the key is correct and the message is intended
for, (4) Decrypts the    using ’s public key
to get  





  
 


  , where

  stands for the decryption algorithm corresponding to
, (5) Computes  





 using 
 
(which al-
ready passed the verification in (3)), (6) Compares the above
two  s. If the two  s are equal, then both the
sender and the message are authenticated. The receiver de-
crypts the message using 
 
. Otherwise, the message was
modified during transmission, and the receiver discards it.
It is worth pointing out that the improved CRTHACS has
an extra advantage over the original one, viz., better effi-
ciency because computing  
 
and 
 
will not involve
public key encryption/decryption operations.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a solution which defeats
a number of recent attacks, satisfies all original goals, and
provides better performance.
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